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Introduction
Although ultrasound has been used in various settings 
for decades, it is only in the past 10 to 15 years that 
critical care physicians have increasingly become 
aware of its usefulness. For example, critical care 
echocardio  graphy was initially used in patients following 
cardiac surgery; soon it expanded to include diagnosis 
and monitoring in the ICU [1,2].
While critical care ultrasound is seen as an indis-
pensable tool in the ICU nowadays, proper training and 
assessment modules are still lacking in many countries. 
Th   e level of competency of practitioners varies greatly - 
some are very experienced and knowledgeable, while 
others have little practical experience. International state-
ments (guidelines) specifying the requirements for diﬀ  er-
ent levels of competency and the scope of knowledge 
have been published [3,4]. Th   ese statements acknowledge 
the need for establishing a uniﬁ  ed training pathway, the 
rationale of which mostly rests on improving the clinical 
skills of the physicians, hence the manage  ment and care 
of patients.
Th   is article examines the need for establishing a proper 
training and assessment program but from a medical-
legal perspective. Th  e competency of healthcare pro-
viders and the provision of a reasonable standard of 
healthcare service are inter-related, and the failure of 
either one has not only legal but also cost and psycho-
logical implications for healthcare providers and patients. 
While this article is written from an Australian legal 




Australia is a common law country. Under the common 
law system a medical practitioner owes two diﬀ  erent 
duties to patients: contractual and tortious. Breach of 
these duties not only renders the practitioner liable for 
breach of contract and negligence, respectively, but also 
exposes him/her to unsatisfactory professional conduct 
or professional misconduct under legislation [5].
Contractual duty
A contract is established when a patient pays the service 
fee and the doctor or hospital accepts it. Upon accepting 
the fee, the doctor has a contractual duty to provide a 
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patient with reasonable skill and care [6]. Th  ere is an 
implied term in the contract where the doctor is to 
exercise ‘reasonable skill and care’ in the provision of 
professional advice and treatment. Th   ere is also a duty to 
warn the patient of any material risk inherent in the 
proposed treatment or procedure. However, there is no 
warranty that the treatment will succeed, unless a 
contract was entered into with such an intention [7].
Tortious duty - duty under the law of tort
A ‘tort’ in law means civil wrong. Tort law is primarily 
concerned with compensating a person suﬀ  ering  from 
injury or damages for another’s wrongful acts or omissions, 
such as through negligence. Tort arises as a result of a 
breach of a duty imposed by law. Th  ese laws are mostly 
laid down by judges over time in common law countries 
(for example, Australia, UK, India, USA, Canada), but are 
codiﬁ  ed (legislated) in countries with a civil law system 
(most European countries).
Th  e largest area of tort law is the law of negligence, 
which requires that a person must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts (or omissions) that he/she could reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure his/her neighbours [8]. 
Note that ‘neighbours’ has taken a broad meaning to 
include anybody that the person may have a professional 
relationship with. In the case of a doctor-patient relation-
ship, the patient is the doctor’s ‘neighbour’ and the 
doctor must act reasonably to avoid any foreseeable risks 
that may cause harm to his/her patient. When a hospital 
accepts a patient, the hospital (including the treating 
doctors) automatically inherits a tortious duty owed to 
the patient who is now its ‘neighbour’.
While there is no obligation for a doctor to provide 
professional service in every instance, those who choose 
to act must do so carefully to avoid inﬂ  icting harm on 
patients. Similar to contractual duty, there is a duty on 
the doctor’s part to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
the provision of advice and treatment, and a duty to warn 
the patient of any material risk inherent in the proposed 
treatment or procedure [9].
Breach of duty
Breach of duty is the failure to meet the duty imposed 
under a contract or tort law. In a doctor-patient relation-
ship, it is the failure to provide the required professional 
service (in the form of diagnosis, advice or treatment); or 
the failure to provide such service at a reasonable 
standard. A wrong diagnosis or errors in treatment do 
not by themselves establish a breach of duty, provided 
that the process of arriving at those decisions is carried 
out with reasonable skill and care - a standard reasonably 
expected of a practitioner with an equivalent level of 
training and experience [9].
Before the Tort Law Reform in Australia, the standard 
of care to be observed by medical practitioners was not 
to be determined solely or even primarily by medical 
practice. It was for the court to judge what standard 
should be expected from the medical profession [9,10]. In 
other words, the doctor’s conduct has to conform to the 
standard of reasonable care demanded by the law [11]. 
Following the Tort Law Reform and enactments of the 
Civil Liability Acts (or its equivalents) in most Australian 
states between 2002 and 2003, the standard of care is 
taken to be a standard that conforms with the opinion 
that is widely held by a signiﬁ  cant number of respected 
or competent practitioners in the ﬁ  eld, unless the court 
considers that opinion is irrational or unreasonable [12]. 
Th  is is similar to the approach adopted in the UK, and 
has the eﬀ   ect of avoiding unacceptable results where 
small pockets of medical opinion might otherwise 
determine the standard, even where the great majority of 
medical opinion would take a diﬀ  erent view [13]. Th  e 
qualiﬁ   er for the approach is the ‘rationality’ or 
‘reasonable  ness’ of the opinion. If an opinion is deemed 
irrational or unreasonable, even if it is opined by most 
practitioners as acceptable or reasonable practice, it will 
not be accepted by the court (Box 1).
Standard of care
Th  e requisite standard of care is reasonable skills and 
care reasonably expected of a practitioner with the same 
standing. Th  e standard of care is diﬀ  erent in cases of 
diagnosis and treatment, and in cases of giving advice 
and information. In the former case responsible 
professional opinion will have an inﬂ  uential,  often 
decisive role to play. Th  e latter case, where the patient 
has been given all the relevant information to choose 
between undergoing or not undergoing the treatment, is 
not dependent upon medical standards or practices [10]. 
In treatment and diagnosis cases, the training, 
qualiﬁ  cations and the prac  tice of a practitioner will be 
examined closely to decide if a practitioner has failed to 
provide the required standard of care.
Qualifi  cations and experience
A practitioner is expected to have the relevant qualiﬁ  -
cations and experience when performing a particular 
procedure or treatment. He/she will be expected to meet 
the same general standard as his/her experienced 
colleagues (Box 2) [9]. Th  e purpose is to protect the 
public from doctors performing procedures they are not 
familiar with, and to avoid doctors from invoking 
‘inexperience’ as a defence to an action for professional 
negligence [14,15]. On the other hand, specialists, or 
doctors who hold themselves out as having special skills, 
may be required to meet the standard of a doctor with 
those special skills or a higher standard than the ordinary 
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expected the practitioner will possess the relevant skills 
and experience in that particular application.
A healthcare institution or employer has a duty to 
ensure that the doctor provided is adequately qualiﬁ  ed to 
carry out the procedure in question [16]. In Brus v ACT 
[16], the defendant hospital was held negligent in permit-
ting a registrar to perform a vaginal hysterectomy that 
was beyond the capacity of the registrar in question. As a 
result of poor surgical skills, the patient’s fallopian tube 
was entrapped in the suture line and later prolapsed into 
her vagina, causing sustained pain. Th  e hospital, as 
employer, was held liable for negligence. In the context of 
critical care ultrasound, hospitals and employers have a 
duty to ensure doctors performing ultrasound are 
properly trained to perform such procedures.
Continuing education and up-to-date information
As part of a duty to exercise reasonable skills and care, 
there is a duty on a doctor in certain circumstances to 
inform themselves of up-to-date information concerning a 
proposed treatment or procedure. Clinical practice 
changes over time as new evidence emerges. A failure to 
keep abreast of the latest developments in clinical prac  tice 
that results in an adverse outcome to a patient may be seen 
as professional negligence in some cases (Box 3) [17].
Failure to take further action: further investigation, risk 
minimisation and referral
‘Ultrasound, biopsy and referral were all available as 
reasonable options in the circumstances. It was a breach 
of duty in the circumstances not to utilize the available 
option’ was the comment given by a medical expert and 
was accepted by the court in the case of Boehm v Deleuil 
[18]. In that case, two general practitioners (GPs) practic-
ing in the same medical centre were held to be in breach 
of their duty by performing inadequate examinations and 
misdiagnosing malignant ﬁ  brous histiocytoma for lipoma 
in the popliteal fossa. As a result, the patient’s left leg was 
amputated above the knee. Th  e argument point of that 
case was not centred upon the misdiagnosis but on the 
poor standard of the service provided by the two doctors. 
It was found by expert evidence that, by not performing 
further investigations, the two doctors fell short of a 
professional standard that was reasonably expected of a 
doctor of their experience.
Where there is a possibility to guard against a fore-
seeable risk (no matter how small, provided it is not 
remote or fanciful) by adopting a means involving little 
diﬃ   culty or expense, the failure to adopt such means will, 
in general, be professional negligence (Box 4) [19]. For 
example, in Halverson v Dobler [20], a young patient 
visited his GP on a number of occasions over a number of 
years for syncopal events, but the GP failed to perform a 
single electrocardiogram on the patient despite negative 
neurological investigations. When the patient was 
18 years old, he had another episode of syncope that left 
him with hypoxic brain damage. It was found later that 
the patient had long QT syndrome, which could be easily 
picked up by electrocardiogram. Th   e GP was held liable 
for professional negligence [20]. Deliberately (or perhaps 
recklessly) taking a risk of grave danger, when that risk 
could be avoided relatively easily with little expense or 
risk, will amount to negligence (Box 5) [21].
In some cases, a practitioner may breach his/her duty if 
he/she does not realize his/her limitations and fails to 
Box 1. Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med L R 393
In Hucks v Cole, a pregnant woman presented to her general 
practitioner (GP) with septic spot but was given no treatment. 
The woman gave birth 3 days later but developed more spots. 
The GP prescribed and continued tetracycline despite pathology 
results showing that the bacteria was sensitive to penicillin. 
The woman later developed fulminating septicaemia and was 
seriously ill. At the trial, although a number of distinguished 
medical experts gave evidence that they would not give 
penicillin, the GP was found to have been negligent nevertheless. 
The court found the medical expert opinion unreasonable 
because the risk of causing grave danger could have easily and 
inexpensively been avoided [21].
Box 2. Hypothetical scenario of an inexperienced 
practitioner performing an echocardiography
A doctor with little experience and training in echocardiography 
decides to perform an echocardiogram on a patient with acute 
onset dyspnea and hypotension. The fi  ndings are reported to be 
normal and later the patient dies of tamponade. While a missed 
or wrong diagnosis itself is not necessarily a breach of duty, a 
‘substandard’ procedure is. In this case, as soon as the doctor 
holds the transducer, he/she is professing to be fl  uent in the 
technique. Others, thinking that he is experienced in the fi  eld, 
may not doubt his skills and may rely on his fi  ndings in managing 
the patient.
Box 3. SESAHS v King [2006] NSWCA 2
In SESAHS v King, a pediatric oncologist acted in accordance with 
an outdated overseas protocol involving an experimental and 
controversial procedure to treat a 13 year old with a tumour in 
the spine. At the time, it was known that the procedure carried 
considerable risk of complications in the central nervous system 
(including paraplegia), and an update of the treatment regime 
was published subsequently. The oncologist was not aware of 
the change and continued treating the child according to the 
outdated protocol. As a result, the child became quadriplegic. 
The hospital was found liable for damages due to negligence 
[17]. It is the duty of doctors to ensure they are in a good position 
to receive up-to-date information.
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defendant GP found a lump in the plaintiﬀ  ’s left breast. 
Examination by mammography and ultrasound did not 
suggest the presence of malignancy. Needle biopsy was 
not carried out. Instead, the GP attempted to excise the 
lump in the surgery. Th  is attempt was thwarted by 
excessive bleeding. Th   e patient was referred to a surgeon 
only after 2 months, and the lumpectomy performed by 
the surgeon revealed the lump was malignant. Although 
denied by the defendant, the court considered the delay 
in referral was to avoid the opprobrium associated with 
the botched procedure. Th   e cancer had metastasized and 
the plaintiﬀ   later died as a result. Th   e court accepted that 
the delay in diagnosis meant the patient lost the chance 
of a full recovery or at least a longer life. Th  e  contentious 
point was again not the missed diagnosis but the standard 
of skill and care provided by the GP. Th   e duty to refer is 
now recognized as part of the reasonable skill and care 
expected from a doctor. Where ultrasound has been 
applied and the practitioner is uncertain of the ﬁ  ndings, 
it behoves that practitioner to refer the patient to a more 
skilled sonographer. For example, if a basic (or level 1) 
echocardiogram is provided in the acute situation and 
the operator identiﬁ  es unexplained abnormalities, then 
he/she should refer the patient for a full echocardio-
graphic study.
Failure to diagnose
Failure to diagnose and misdiagnosis per se are not evi-
dence of breach of the standard of care. Th  e law of 
negligence in Australia recognizes the limitations of 
doctors, and does not require doctors to be perfect [23]. 
Th  e law is not concerned with absolute scientiﬁ  c accu-
racy in making diagnoses, but it does require a doctor 
with ordinary competence to exercise reasonable skill 
and care in reaching a diagnosis [24]. In doing so, he/she 
must show the standard of his/her practice is concordant 
with a competent practitioner of his/her experience 
(Boxes 6 and 7) [25-27].
Damages and injury
For a breach of duty (or contract) to be actionable, the 
suﬀ  erer (patient) needs to show he/she suﬀ  ered damages 
(for example, loss of income, unnecessary and extra 
medical bills) or injury (either physical or psychological) 
as a result of the breach and that these were reasonably 
foreseeable.
Implications for practitioners and hospitals
Th   e legal duty for a medical practitioner is to ensure the 
services he/she provides are of reasonable skill and care as 
expected of a practitioner with the same level of training 
and experience. In order to achieve this, medical 
practitioners have the responsibility to: ensure he/she is 
properly trained in the procedure he/she is performing; 
keep himself/herself up-to-date in the area he/she is 
practicing, or in the procedure he/she is performing; 
recognize his/her own limitations and know when to refer 
a case to more experienced colleagues or specialists; and 
perform further investigations or procedures where 
appropriate to minimize treatment risks and misdiagnosis.
Th   erefore, an intensive care practitioner may easily ﬁ  nd 
himself/herself in breach of duty of care if he/she: 
performs critical care ultrasound that is below the 
standard expected of a competent (medical practitioner) 
sonographer; applies out-of-date knowledge or criteria to 
his/her study, or fails to realize and apply the latest 
criteria or measurement methods in his/her studies; does 
not seek help from more experienced colleagues in 
diﬃ   cult cases; and fails to perform ultrasound when it is 
easily available in his/her setting.
Th   e hospital is also liable for breach of duty by any of 
its employee practitioners. Th  e employer hospital has a 
duty to ensure its staﬀ   who perform critical care ultra-
sound are competent and qualiﬁ  ed.
Box 4. Sherry v Australasian Conference Association & 3 
Ors [2006] NSWSC 75
In Sherry v Australasian Conference Association & 3 Ors [2006] 
NSWSC 75, Mr Sherry underwent minimally invasive direct 
coronary arterial bypass, and was admitted to ICU on completion 
of the procedure. There was ample evidence that the patient was 
suff  ering from hypovolaemia, possibly blood loss, the next day. 
The patient also complained of chest pain and, on examination, 
decreased air entry on the left chest. The intensivist-in-charge 
made a provisional diagnosis of pneumothorax without 
performing a simple percussion test. X-ray revealed the patient in 
fact had haemothorax, which the intensivist-in-charge had failed 
to diagnose in time. The patient was left in a shock state and later 
died. The intensivist-in-charge was found to have been negligent. 
The court, with the support of expert evidence, held the view 
that if the intensivist-in-charge had performed a percussion 
test, he would have been alerted to haemothorax rather than 
pneumothorax and would have taken appropriate action. The 
hospital was also found to have been negligent in this case for 
providing poorly qualifi  ed nursing staff   because the nursing staff   
failed to recognize the vital signs of hypovolaemia and also failed 
to alert the intensivist-in-charge.
Box 5. A scenario of blind versus ultrasound-guided 
pericardiocentesis
Blind pericardiocentesis is still commonly practiced nowadays. 
However, when ultrasound is easily accessible, the failure to 
use echocardiogram to guide pericardiocentesis may amount 
to negligence because the benefi  ts of using such a method far 
outweigh the risks involved.
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In order to avoid incurring liability while performing 
critical care ultrasound, intensivists should ensure they are 
properly trained and competent in the procedure. Th  e  best 
way to acquire competency in critical care ultrasonography 
is to complete a well-structured accredita  tion or certi-
ﬁ   cation program. While the certiﬁ   cate itself does not 
render a practitioner immune from professional negli-
gence, the attainment of the recognized level of compe-
tency means there is less chance of breaching the standard 
of care. Another important beneﬁ  t of having a certiﬁ  cation 
process is that it allows other practitioners or employers to 
identify those who are competent to perform critical care 
ultrasound, thereby providing better patient care by 
allowing the procedure to be performed by only those who 
are qualiﬁ  ed.
In Australia, the launching of a two-tiered critical care 
echocardiography certiﬁ  cation program is on its way. Th  e 
level 1 certiﬁ  cation aims for a minimum level of training 
and experience to perform basic critical care echo-
cardiography. Certiﬁ  cation can be attained by attending 
workshops and by submitting a required number of case 
studies. A more advanced level (level 2) certiﬁ  cation pro-
vides a qualiﬁ  cation (Diploma in Diag  nostic Ultra  sound 
in Critical Care Ultrasound) by exami  na  tion to practi-
tioners. To avoid variability in standards, both certiﬁ  -
cation processes are provided by a single profes  sional 
body that is well-recognized and widely accepted in 
Australia and New Zealand, the Australasian Society of 
Ultrasound in Medicine.
Conclusion
Medical practitioners owe a duty of care, arising from 
contract and/or tort laws, to their patients. Th  e duty of 
care demands the practitioner provides a professional 
service with reasonable skill and care - a standard of care 
that is expected of a competent practitioner in the same 
position. By providing a service that is below the expected 
standard of care will result in a breach of duty and render 
a practitioner liable for breach of contract or negligence. 
In some cases, it may amount to professional misconduct.
Breaches of standard of care come in various forms. 
With the costs of ultrasound equipment decreasing and 
the advancement in ultrasound technology and know-
ledge, it is inevitable that ultrasound will become an 
indispensable tool in the next few years. In fact, many 
ICUs nowadays have an ultrasound machine available in 
their units, or at least accessible in the hospitals. 
Considering the beneﬁ   ts it confers on patients, it is 
unacceptable and almost inexcusable in some cases not 
to utilize ultrasound in the management of patients, for 
example, ultrasound-guided pericardiocentesis and 
vascular access. Practitioners, on the other hand, have to 
ensure they have the required skills and experience to 
enable them to perform and interpret the studies compe-
tently. Th   ey should also keep themselves up-to-date with 
knowledge, realize their own limitations and seek help 
from more experienced colleagues if necessary.
A structured certiﬁ  cation program is probably the best 
approach to equip practitioners with the necessary skills 
and knowledge. However, it should be remembered that, 
at least in Australia, the certiﬁ  cate per se does not protect 
medical practitioners from legal action. It is professional 
skills and knowledge that do.
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Box 6. Not negligent for failure to diagnose
In Walton-Taylor v Wilson, a patient in her third trimester 
complained of severe abdominal pain to her GP. The GP 
induced labour and the neonate was healthy. It was later 
found that the pain was due to a perforated appendix, and the 
patient subsequently required sub-total hysterectomy due to 
the complications. The GP was found not liable for failure to 
diagnose because the management plan adopted by the GP was 
appropriate [25]. Similarly, in Holliday v Curtin, a GP was held not 
liable for failure to diagnose breast cancer on a young female 
based on the fact that the doctor had showed reasonable skill 
and care, and there was insuffi   cient evidence of a persisting 
abnormality to have alerted the GP that he should order further 
investigations [26].
Box 7. Negligent for failure to diagnose
In O’Shea v Sullivan, a GP and a pathology laboratory were 
held liable for failure to detect cervical cancer in a patient who 
complained of intermenstrual bleeding and post-coital bleeding 
[27]. The initial examination made by the GP was less than 
reasonably thorough. In a subsequent visit, the GP examined the 
patient’s cervix and mistook the malignancy for an erosion or 
small ectopic columnar epithelium. The GP did not pursue the 
case further and failed to refer the patient to a gynaecologist. 
Although pap smear examination was carried out, the pathology 
laboratory incorrectly reported the fi  ndings to be ‘mild squamous 
atypical cells possibly due to infl  ammation’ rather than CIN3/
micro-invasive cancer cells. Given the marked diff  erence 
between mild atypia and CIN3, the wrong assessment could 
not be explained by an acceptable diff  erence in interpretation. 
Both the GP and the pathology laboratory were found to have 
provided a substandard professional service leading to missed 
diagnosis.
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